Kaplow, Louis: Competition policy and price fixing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics by Louis Kaplow
I his preface, Louis Kaplow writes, “The purpose of this book is to offer a unifying conceptual framework for the normative study of taxation and related subjects in public economics.” This framework is very much in the optimal tax mode, where a social welfare function with individual utilities as arguments is maximized, subject to a government budget constraint. To this reviewer, optimal tax t...
متن کاملLouis Kaplow Harvard Law School “ A Distribution - Neutral Perspective on Tax Expenditure Limitations ” UCLA
A recent wave of literature, partly motivated by Presidential campaign tax reform plans, advances and analyzes the effects of proposals to limit tax expenditures. In addition to reducing distortions caused by favoritism for some types of expenditures over others, many of these reforms are advanced on distributive grounds and because the resulting broader base enables lower marginal tax rates an...
متن کاملPrice Floors and Competition
A potential source of instability of many economic models is that agents have little incentive to stick with the equilibrium. We show experimentally that this may matter with price competition. The control variable is a price floor, which increases the cost of deviating from equilibrium. Theoretically the floor allows competitors to obtain higher profits, as low prices are excluded. However, be...
متن کاملPrice and capacity competition
We study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria in a model where firms compete over capacities and prices. Our model economy corresponds to a two-stage game. First, firms choose their capacity levels. Second, after the capacity levels are observed, they set prices. Given the capacities and prices, consumers allocate their demands across the firms. We establish the existence of pure strategy oli...
متن کاملInformation Provision and Price Competition
Two sellers with ex-ante identical products, whose qualities can be either high or low, first choose a binary information structure, modeled as the probability that the signal reveals the state. After the buyer independently draws one private signal from each information structure, the sellers then each choose a price in the second stage. We identify two equilibria in information structures, a ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0931-8658
DOI: 10.1007/s00712-014-0402-8