Kant’s Account of Epistemic Normativity

Abstract According to a common interpretation, most explicitly defended by Onora O’Neill and Patricia Kitcher, Kant held that epistemic obligations normatively depend on moral obligations. That is, were rational agent not bound any obligation, then she would be obligation either. By contrast, in this paper, I argue that, according Kant, some are independent from obligations, indeed absolute. This view, which call epistemicism , has two parts. First, it claims the absence of other kinds agents still these i. e., latter independent. Second, no matter what at stake, normativity is absolute cannot undercut or sort obligation. The argument turns an exploratory reading Kant’s remarks “What Is Orientation Thinking?” (1786) about maxim “thinking for oneself” as “supreme touchstone truth”. In contrast if we interpret stating unifying principle theoretical practical reason, must epistemic, merely imperative. result, argue, vindicates illuminates interesting lessons conception category “epistemic” norms. Further, helps us make headway with enigmatic unity reason Groundwork first second Critiques Lectures Logic . On my proposal, principles uses unified through formal principle.