Kameko's homomorphism and the algebraic transfer

Cryptanalysis of an Algebraic Privacy Homomorphism

RAPPORT Homomorphism preserving algebraic specifications require hidden

Although every computable data type has an initial algebra speci-cation with hidden functions, it may happen that some of the homo-morphic images of the data type are not models of the speciication. The latter are reducts of algebras that would be models of the specii-cation if all its functions were visible, whereas the homomorphic images of the data type are independent of the speciication an...

A Cryptanalysis of the Original Domingo-Ferrer’s Algebraic Privacy Homomorphism

We propose a cryptanalysis of the original Domingo-Ferrer’s algebraic privacy homomorphism. We show that the scheme over Zn can be broken by d + 1 known plaintexts in O(d3 log n) time when it has d times expansion through the encryption. Furthermore even when the public modulus n is kept secret, it can be broken by d + 2 known plaintexts in time at most O(d5 log(dn)).

Categorical Abstract Algebraic Logic: Leibniz Equality and Homomorphism Theorems

The study of structure systems, an abstraction of the concept of firstorder structures, is continued. Structure systems have algebraic systems rather than universal algebras as their algebraic reducts. Moreover, their relational component consists of a collection of relation systems on the underlying functors rather than simply a system of relations on a single set. Congruence systems of struct...

Known-plaintext cryptanalysis of the Domingo-Ferrer algebraic privacy homomorphism scheme

We propose cryptanalysis of the First Domingo-Ferrer’s algebraic privacy homomorphism E :Zn → (Zp ×Zq)d where n= pq. We show that the scheme can be broken by (d+ 1) known plaintexts in O(d3 log2 n) time. Even when the modulus n is kept secret, it can be broken by 2(d + 1) known plaintexts in O(d4 logdn+ d3 log2 n+ ε(m)) time with overwhelming probability.  2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.