Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution and Alternating Offers Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Randomized dictatorship and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
Randomized dictatorship,” one of the simplest ways to solve bargaining situations, works as follows: a fair coin toss determines the “dictator”—the player to be given his first-best payoff. The two major bargaining solutions, that of Nash (1950) and that of Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), Pareto-dominate this process. However, whereas the existing literature offers axiomatizations of the Nash sol...
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A bargaining solution guarantees minimal equity if each player’s payoff is at least as large as the minimum of the payoffs assigned to him by the equal-gain (i.e., egalitarian) and equal-loss solutions. The KalaiSmorodinsky solution is the unique scale-invariant 2-person solution with this property. There does not exist a scale-invariant n-person solution with this property.
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The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is characterized by three axioms: balanced focal point, disagreement point monotonicity, and restricted IIA.
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Roth (1977) axiomatized the Nash (1950) bargaining solution without Pareto optimality, replacing it by strong individual rationality in Nash’s axiom list. In a subsequent work (Roth, 1979) he showed that when strong individual rationality is replaced by weak individual rationality, the only solutions that become admissible are the Nash and the disagreement solutions. In this paper I derive anal...
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We consider bargaining problems under the assumption that players are loss averse, i.e., experience disutility from obtaining an outcome lower than some reference point. We follow the approach of Shalev (2002) by imposing the self-supporting condition on an outcome: an outcome z in a bargaining problem is self-supporting under a given bargaining solution, whenever transforming the problem using...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics Letters
سال: 2013
ISSN: 2162-2078,2162-2086
DOI: 10.4236/tel.2013.31012