Justifications of welfare guarantees under normalized utilities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
When Are Welfare Guarantees Robust?
Computational and economic results suggest that social welfare maximization and combinatorial auction design are much easier when bidders’ valuations satisfy the “gross substitutes” condition. The goal of this paper is to evaluate rigorously the folklore belief that the main take-aways from these results remain valid in settings where the gross substitutes condition holds only approximately. We...
متن کاملNash Social Welfare for Indivisible Items under Separable, Piecewise-Linear Concave Utilities
Recently Cole and Gkatzelis [CG15] gave the first constant factor approximation algorithm for the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents, under additive valuations, so as to maximize the Nash social welfare (NSW). We give constant factor algorithms for a substantial generalization of their problem – to the case of separable, piecewise-linear concave utility functions. We give two suc...
متن کاملNormalized Tenacity and Normalized Toughness of Graphs
In this paper, we introduce the novel parameters indicating Normalized Tenacity ($T_N$) and Normalized Toughness ($t_N$) by a modification on existing Tenacity and Toughness parameters. Using these new parameters enables the graphs with different orders be comparable with each other regarding their vulnerabilities. These parameters are reviewed and discussed for some special graphs as well.
متن کاملSearching Market Equilibria under Uncertain Utilities
Our basic model is a noncooperative multi-player game in which the governments of neighboring countries trade emission reductions. We prove the existence of a market equilibrium (combining properties of Pareto and Nash equilibria) and study algorithms of searching a market equilibrium. The algorithms are interpreted as repeated auctions in which the auctioneer has no information on countries’ c...
متن کاملDividing goods or bads under additive utilities
We compare the Egalitarian Equivalent and the Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes rules to divide a bundle of goods (heirlooms) or a bundle of bads (chores). For goods the Competitive division fares better, as it is Resource Monotonic, and makes it harder to strategically misreport preferences. But for bads, the Competitive rule, unlike the Egalitarian one, is multivalued, harder to comp...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM SIGecom Exchanges
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1551-9031
DOI: 10.1145/3381329.3381337