Justification as ignorance and logical omniscience
نویسندگان
چکیده
I argue that there is a tension between two of the most distinctive theses Sven Rosenkranz’s Justification as Ignorance: (i) central thesis concerning justification, according to which an agent has propositional justification believe p iff they are in no position know and (ii) desire avoid logical omniscience by imposing only “realistic” idealizations on epistemic agents.
منابع مشابه
Logical omniscience as infeasibility
Article history: Available online 20 August 2013 MSC: 03B45 03B60 03F07 68Q17
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Asian Journal of Philosophy
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['2731-4642']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-021-00002-2