Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation

Constitutional Economics/Constitutional Politics

Why does the treatment of American constitutional politics presented in We the People depart so radically from models of constitutional deliberation developed in the type of constitutional economics pioneered by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock? The paper defines three premises that account for the divergence, and concludes by proposing an inquiry into constitutional design that requires insig...

The Politics of Judicial Opposition

Existing studies of judicial decisionmaking have found that elected judges are more likely to dissent and to oppose judges from the same party. These findings are explained by elected judges having stronger preferences for risk or being more independent. In this paper, I offer an alternative explanation: judges’ efforts to be retained should yield different patterns of opposition among judges f...

From Constitutional Body to Policy Arena: Politics, Inescapable Companion of the Italian Judicial Council

The new architecture of the Italian Republic, set up in 1948, foresaw the creation of a High Judicial Council, entrusted with full competences in recruiting, promoting, assessing, and training judges and prosecutors. The new body began what has been called a long process of institutionalisation, which ended around the end of the 1970s. Such a process expanded its capacities to steer and govern ...

Lobbying and Information in Politics

Constitutional Law