Judicial Deference to Inconsistent Agency Statutory Interpretations

The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations

A Theory of Judicial Deference

In many instances, appellate courts defer to lower courts and administrative agencies; the appellate court allows the other agent’s decision to stand even though the appellate court has strong reason to believe that decision incorrect. We provide a model in which such deference is rational. Our model is set in a two-dimensional case space. One dimension reflects "global" facts that are known to...

An OWL ontology library representing judicial interpretations

The article introduces JudO, an OWL2 ontology library of legal knowledge that relies on the metadata contained in judicial documents. JudO represents the interpretations performed by a judge while conducting legal reasoning towards the adjudication of a case. To the aim of this application, judicial interpretation is intended in the restricted sense of the acts of judicial subsumption performed...

Contracting in the Presence of Judicial Agency

While a key function of contracts is to provide incentives, the incentives of judges to enforce the terms of a contract have rarely been examined. This paper develops a simple model of judicial agency in which judges are corrupt and can be bribed by contracting parties. Higher-powered contracts expose contracting parties to more frequent and more severe corruption, which in turn lessens the inc...

In Deference to Reference

This dissertation consists in three separate papers. The topic of Iln Deference to Refernnts' is the semantic structure of belief reports of the form 'A believes that pl. I argue that no existing theory of these sentences satisfactorily accounts for anaphoric relations among expressions inside and outside of the embedded complement sentences. I propose a new account of belief reports, which ass...