Joint Offloading Decision and Resource Allocation for Vehicular Fog-Edge Computing Networks: A Contract-Stackelberg Approach

With the popularity of mobile devices and development computationally intensive applications, researchers are focusing on offloading computation to mobile-edge computing (MEC) server due its high computational efficiency low communication delay. As resources an MEC limited, vehicles in urban area who have abundant idle should be fully utilized. However, tasks faces many challenging issues. In this article, we introduce a vehicular fog-edge paradigm formulate it as multistage Stackelberg game deal with these Specifically, not obligated share resources, let alone disclose their private information (e.g., stay time amount resources). Therefore, first stage, design contract-based incentive mechanism motivate contribute resources. Next, complicated interactions among vehicles, roadside unit (RSU), server, device users, is coordinate all parties transaction make entities benefit. second third stages, based game, develop pricing strategies that maximize utilities parties. The analytical forms optimal for each stage given. Simulation results demonstrate effectiveness our proposed mechanism, reveal trends energy consumption decisions users various parameters, present performance comparison between framework existing networks.