Joint liability versus individual liability in credit contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Joint Liability Versus Individual Liability in Credit Contracts
I compare welfare generated by a credit contract with individual liability and a contract with joint liability. The problem is credit rationing caused by limited liability and unobservable investment decisions. Joint liability induces borrowers to monitor each other, however the lender can also monitor. I show that wealthier borrowers may prefer riskier investments when liability is joint, whic...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.01.007