منابع مشابه
Joint Contract under Inequity Aversion
The standard contract theory adopts the traditional hypothesis of pure self-interest. However, a series of game experiments have proven that people are not any self-interest but also inequity averse. Then, how will the inequity aversion influence the optimal contract for multiple agents? This paper attempts to obtain new theoretical insights by incorporating inequity aversion into the standard ...
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Optimal Incentive Contracts under Inequity Aversion We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a strong tendency towards linear sharing rules. Thi...
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Inequity aversion is a special form of other regarding preferences and captures many features of reciprocal behavior, an apparently robust pattern in human nature. Using this concept we analyze the Moral Hazard problem and derive several results which differ from conventional contract theory. Our three key insights are: First, inequity aversion plays a crucial role in the design of optimal cont...
متن کاملInequity Aversion Revisited
We provide the first systematic study of the robustness of parameter estimates for the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model of inequity aversion with respect to (i) the occurrence of efficiency concerns; (ii) the scale of payoffs; and (iii) the game used (i.e., cross-game consistency). Moreover, we provide evidence of a bias in the estimates that occurs if one does not correct for strategic considerations...
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In labor markets, some individuals have, or believe to have, less data on the determinants of success than others, e.g., due to differential access to technology or role models. We provide experimental evidence on how informational differences translate into performance differences in competitive environments. In a laboratory tournament setting, we varied subjects’ information about the potenti...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Service Science and Management
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1940-9893,1940-9907
DOI: 10.4236/jssm.2009.23018