Joint bidding and horizontal subcontracting
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper investigates joint bidding when firms have incentives to sign subcontracts with each other after competing in the stage. A consortium affects horizontal subcontracting market and, through backward induction, alters firms’ bids. Our findings challenge current legal practice that consortia without efficiencies must pass “no-solo-bidding test”, requiring its members could not bid stand-alone. framework predicts formation of a temporary consortium, which has feature it dissolves submitting losing bid, benefits procurer. The winning is more competitive as compared structural consortium.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1873-7986', '0167-7187']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102727