Johanna Seibt's General Process Theory

The article addresses Johanna Seibt's General Process Theory. Critique of substantialism or “myth substance” as a set presuppositions is presented. Substantialist are demonstrated to hamper an adequate solution persistence in time, partly because this issue tends be considered only with regard objects — persons things. A contradiction between the change attributes object Leibniz's law identity indiscernibles shown based on additional substantialist principles, which altogether constitute aporia change. principal theories endurantism and perdurantism both lead contradictions. Perdurantism seemingly rejects idea substance when it construes composed temporal parts. However, these parts interpreted some presuppositions. Substantialism rests particularism (even though historically, there were also non-particularist interpretations substance); particularism, turn, universals-particulars dualism. Particularism consists contradictions, does not manage solve individuation. Specifically, identifying particulars individuals abstract general should jettisoned. This will permit admit existence non-particular individuals. Theory outlined terms processes model subjectless activities. Finally, problem outlined.