Job Search and Hiring with Two-sided Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills

Two-sided Search Games

NUMBER 4 A target hides himself in one of the boxes 1,2, ... , m with probability distribution X=<Xl, ... , Xm) and can move to any of other boxes after each unsuccessful search by a searcher. The searcher is not informed of x and continues search until the target is found. He is informed of Ci'S, i.e., examination costs of each box, and ai's, i= 1, ... , m, where ai is the probability of overl...

Two-sided search and perfect segregation with fixed search costs

This paper studies a two-sided search model with the following characteristics: there is a continuum of agents with different types in each population, match utility is nontransferable, and agents incur a fixed search cost in each period. When utility functions are additively separable in types and strictly increasing in the partner’s type, there is a unique matching equilibrium. It exhibits pe...

Networking Skills and Hiring Managers

Two-sided Matching with Incomplete Information∗

Stability in a two-sided matching model with non-transferrable utility and with incomplete information is investigated. Each agent has interdependent preferences which depend on his own type and on the possibly unknown types of agents on the other side of the market. In a one-sided incomplete information model in which workers’ types are private information, a firm joins a worker in a block to ...

Holdup and hiring discrimination with search friction

A holdup problem on workers’ skill investment arises when employers can adopt discriminatory hiring norm to extract higher than socially optimal profit. In such an economy, productivity (skills) and non-productivity oriented characteristics (discrimination) both matter when determining which worker has priority. The resulting firms’ preference is an intertwined ranking order, by virtue of which...