Job Search and Hiring with Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills

نویسندگان

چکیده

We assess South African workseekers’ skills and disseminate the assessment results to explore how limited information affects firm workseeker behavior. Giving workseekers that they can credibly share with firms increases employment earnings better aligns their skills, beliefs search strategies. cannot easily has similar effects on search, but smaller earnings. only shifts interview decisions. These findings show getting credible skill right agents improve outcomes in labor market. (JEL J22, J23, J24, J31, J41, J64, O15)

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: The American Economic Review

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['2640-205X', '2640-2068']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200961