Job market signaling and employer learning
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Job market signaling and employer learning
Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their employees over time. Contrary to the model without employer learning, we find that the Intuitive Criterion does not always select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.018