منابع مشابه
Infinitism, finitude and normativity
I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding ...
متن کاملOn the regress argument for infinitism
This paper critically evaluates the regress argument for infinitism. The dialectic is essentially this. Peter Klein argues that only an infinitist can, without being dogmatic, enhance the credibility of a questioned non-evident proposition. In response, I demonstrate that a foundationalist can do this equally well. Furthermore, I explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of ju...
متن کاملDerivational Parallelism and Ellipsis Parallelism
A central topic in work on ellipsis is the parallelism between missing VPs and their antecedents. There is evidence that parallelism is conditioned both syntactically and semantically. This has resulted in complex hybrid principles that regulate both syntactic structures and their interpretations (e.g., Fox 1995, 2000). We present an alternative, unified account based on parallelism of semantic...
متن کاملDoes Klein's infinitism offer a response to Agrippa's trilemma?
A. The regress of reasons threatens an epistemic agent’s right to claim that any beliefs are justified. In response, Peter Klein’s infinitism argues that an infinite series of supporting reasons of the right type not only is not vicious but can make for epistemic justification. In order to resist the sceptic, infinitism needs to provide reason to think that there is at least one justifie...
متن کاملJohn Turri, "On the Regress Argument for Infinitism"
This paper critically evaluates the regress argument for infinitism. The dialectic is essentially this. Peter Klein argues that only an infinitist can, without being dogmatic, enhance the credibility of a questioned non-evident proposition. In response, I demonstrate that a foundationalist can do this equally well. Furthermore, I explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of ju...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mind
سال: 1911
ISSN: 0026-4423,1460-2113
DOI: 10.1093/mind/xx.78.212