ItS Payback Time: New Insights on Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sustaining Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Local Interaction
This paper studies the repeated prisoners dilemma in a local interaction setup. We construct a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies that sustains cooperation for sufficiently patient players. The notion of sequential equilibrium is extended to extensive form games with inÞnite time horizon. The strategy is embedded in an explicitly deÞned expectation system, which may also be viewed as a ...
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A common observation in experiments involving finite repetition of the prisoners’ dilemma is that players do not always play the single-period dominant strategies (“finking”), but instead achieve some measure of cooperation. Yet finking at each stage is the only Nash equilibrium in the finitely repeated game. We show here how incomplete information about one or both players’ options, motivation...
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The unique Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated n-person Prisoners’ Dilemma calls for defection in all rounds. One way to enforce cooperation in groups is ostracism: players who defect are expelled. If the group’s members prefer not to diminish its size, ostracism hurts the legitimate members of the group as well as the outcast. putting the credibility of the threat in doubt. Nonetheless, ...
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The Emergence and Evolution of Social Norms: Rational Cooperation in a Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
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We provide axiomatic foundations for a simple model of play in prisoners’ dilemma games. The model accommodates cooperation and suggests that players behave as if their expectations about their opponents’ behavior vary with their own choice. We refer to this nonstandard updating as magical thinking. The degree to which players exhibit magical thinking may be heterogeneous in the population and ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4114553