<i>The People’s Game? (Football, Finance & Society)</i> by Stephen Morrow
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Entertainment and Sports Law Journal
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1748-944X
DOI: 10.16997/eslj.108