Iterated Weak Dominance in Strictly Competitive Games of Perfect Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Iterated Weak Dominance in Strictly Competitive Games of Perfect Information
We prove that any strictly competitive perfect-information two-person game with n outcomes is solvable in n−1 steps of elimination of weakly dominated strategies— regardless of the length of the game tree. The given bound is shown to be tight using a variant of Rosenthal's centipede game.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2958