Issues or Identity? Cognitive Foundations of Voter Choice
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Trends in Cognitive Sciences
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1364-6613
DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2016.08.013