Issues of foundations and criteria of law: criticism of the theory of social rules and conventional rule of recognition in “early” R. Dworkin’s doctrine

The article investigates the doctrine of an American jurist, Ronald Dworkin, presented in essay “Social Rules and Legal Theory” (1972) considered as a stage his large-scale polemics with legal positivism. In this author criticizes theory “social rules” conventional “rule recognition”, which is basic for opponents. requires agreed unity practice defends controversial character moral engagement normative grounds criteria law, their priority autonomy against community practices. relevance topic due both to fundamental nature Dworkin - positivists dispute, peculiarities 1972 doctrine, formed number its “cross-cutting” elements. aimed at systematization assessment relies on texts by author, opponents researchers, uses various tools, primarily ideological historical method, focused explication views issues developing history thought. study results are generalization original components R. Dworkin’s localization within dispute between discerning implications. Summing up emphasizes stimulating role evolution rival approaches, well potential philosophy associated problematization link normativity facticity linguistic-analytical idea rule practice, conventionalist account foundations law decenters disagreements.