Issues and Party Competition Under Alternative Electoral Systems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Party Politics
سال: 2002
ISSN: 1354-0688,1460-3683
DOI: 10.1177/1354068802008001006