Is Secured Debt Used to Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An Empirical Analysis
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Corporate spin-offs, bankruptcy, investment, and the value of debt
In a risk-neutral stochastic environment where bankruptcy is possible, it is well-established that coinsurance incentives may lead creditors to prefer mergers over spin-offs, while shareholders may prefer spin-offs. This paper shows that there are two distinct reasons for this. One is due to the concavity of the debt payoff function in the face value of the debt, while the other arises from imp...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.909225