Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information voluntarily provide it. In simple sender-receiver game, we find senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree which is strongly related their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and are accurate on average. Receiver actions also beliefs, suggest many insufficiently skeptical nondisclosed in the absence repeated feedback. (JEL C70, D82, D83)
منابع مشابه
Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1945-7669', '1945-7685']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180217