Is free-energy minimisation the mark of the cognitive?

Abstract A mark of the cognitive should allow us to specify theoretical principles for demarcating from non-cognitive causes behaviour in organisms. Specific criteria are required settle question when evolution life cognition first emerged. An answer this however avoid two pitfalls. It overintellectualising minds other organisms, ascribing them capacities which they have no need given lives lead within niches inhabit. But equally it do justice remarkable flexibility and adaptiveness that can be observed microorganisms not a nervous system. We resist seeking explanations simply because an organism fails exhibit human-like feats thinking, reasoning problem-solving. will show how Karl Friston’s Free-Energy Principle (FEP) serve as basis avoids twin pitfalls or underestimating achievements evolutionarily primitive The FEP purports describe organisation any must instantiate if is remain well-adapted its environment. Living systems plants all way up humans act ways tend long run minimise free energy. If provides cognitive, we argue does, mandates indeed ascribed plants, organisms lack