Is Better Nuclear Weapon Detection Capability Justified?

Environmental Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapon Programs

Environmental sensing of nuclear activities has the potential to detect nuclear weapon programs at early stages, deter nuclear proliferation, and help verify nuclear accords. However, no robust system of detection has been deployed to date. This can be variously attributed to high costs, technical limitations in detector technology, simple countermeasures, and uncertainty about the magnitude or...

Nuclear Weapon Breakout Scenarios: Correcting the Record

First, Glaser and Kemp ignore the potential for breakout using a covert facility which would yield weapon grade uranium from a stock of low enriched uranium (LEU) significantly faster than their estimates, based on enrichment activity at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. Though the paper’s summary and conclusion imply that the possibility of undeclared facilities or feedstock have been incorpor...

Justified Knowledge is Sufficient

Three formal approaches to public knowledge are “any fool” knowledge by McCarthy (1970), Common Knowledge by Halpern and Moses (1990), and Justified Knowledge by Artemov (2004). We compare them to mathematically address the observation that the light-weight systems of Justified Knowledge and ‘any fool knows’ suffice to solve standard epistemic puzzles for which heavier solutions based on Common...

Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World

Nuclear Weapon Effects Test, Evaluation, and Simulation

This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense.