Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
This paper studies investment incentives in the steady state of a dynamic bilateral matching market. Because of search frictions, both parties in a match are partially locked–in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments. The associated holdup problem depends on market conditions and is more important for the long side of the market. In the case of investments in homog...
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reinsurance is widely recognized as an important instrument in the capital management of an insurance company as well as its risk management tool. this thesis is intended to determine premium rates for different types of reinsurance policies. also, given the fact that the reinsurance coverage of every company depends upon its reserves, so different types of reserves and the method of their calc...
The matching interdiction problem in dendrimers
The purpose of the matching interdiction problem in a weighted graph is to find two vertices such that the weight of the maximum matching in the graph without these vertices is minimized. An approximate solution for this problem has been presented. In this paper, we consider dendrimers as graphs such that the weights of edges are the bond lengths. We obtain the maximum matching in some types of...
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I analyze the innovation incentives under monopoly and duopoly provision of horizontally differentiated products purchased via bilateral negotiations, integrating the market structure and innovation literature with the holdup literature. I show that competition can improve local incentives for non-contractible investment. Because innovation levels are generally strategic substitutes, however, t...
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An important theme of modern contract theory is the role contracts play to protect parties from the risk of holdup and thereby encouraging their relationship specific investments. While this perspective has generated valuable insights about various contracts, the underlying models abstract from realistic investment dynamics. We reexamine the role of contracts in a dynamic model that endogenizes...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.04.008