Investment Timing with Incentive-Disincentive Contracts under Asymmetric Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Technology and Investment
سال: 2012
ISSN: 2150-4059,2150-4067
DOI: 10.4236/ti.2012.32011