INVESTMENT CYCLES, STRATEGIC DELAY, AND SELF-REVERSING CASCADES*
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Investment Cycles, Strategic Delay, and Self-Reversing Cascades∗
We study investment cycles and information flows in a model of social learning in which investment returns fluctuate according to a Markov process. In our Waiting Game, agents observe the investment history and a private signal correlated with the current period’s investment return. Agents then decide whether to invest in round 1 or to delay their decision to round 2 of the current period. Casc...
متن کاملInvestment Cycles, Strategic Delay, and Self-Reversing Cascades Web Appendix
Characterization of multiple equilibria In general, the WG will have multiple equilibria, as in Chamley (2004). There is now the possibility of a new regime in which all type-1 agents invest in round 1 and type-0 agents mix in round 1. We call this Regime 2M, which is a sort of “reverse” to Regime M. Let p be the probability that a type-0 agent invests in round 1, and V0(μ0, p) be the expected ...
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This paper studies the interaction between information aggregation and investment cycles with investments exhibiting strategic complementarity. The composition of information aggregation varies across different phases of cycles, which in turn affects the course of investment cycles. The phases of cycles are history dependent for informational reasons, and changes in phases depend on the growth ...
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We develop a model of intrinsic cycles, driven by the decentralized behaviour of entrepreneurs and Þrms making continuous, divisible improvements in their productivity. We show that when the introduction of productivity impovements is endogenous, implementation cycles arise even in the presence of reversible investment and consumptionsmoothing. The implied cyclical equilibrium is unique with...
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We find that VC-backed firms receiving their initial investment in hot markets are less likely to IPO, but conditional on going public are valued higher on the day of their IPO, have more patents and have more citations to their patents. Our results suggest that VCs invest in riskier and more innovative startups in hot markets (rather than just worse firms). This is true even for the most exper...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Economic Review
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0020-6598
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00628.x