Inventory competition and incentives to back-order
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Managerial Incentives and Competition
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IIE Transactions
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0740-817X,1545-8830
DOI: 10.1080/07408170600854750