Interpretivism, First-Person Authority, and Confabulation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Davidson, first-person authority, and the evidence for semantics
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophy of the Social Sciences
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0048-3931,1552-7441
DOI: 10.1177/0048393117705297