Interorganizational Network Coordination under Stress Caused by Repeated Threats of Disasters
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1547-7355
DOI: 10.2202/1547-7355.1629