منابع مشابه
Internet auctions with many traders
We study a multi-unit auction environment similar to eBay. Sellers, each with a single unit of a homogenous good, set reserve prices at their own independent second-price auctions. Each buyer has a private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit. Buyers can bid as often as they like and move between the sellers’ auctions in a dynamic environment. We characterize a perfect Bayesia...
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The usual general equilibrium model of price determination fails to consider a key problem of devising an institutional framework, in the form of a strategic market game, that provides incentives for individual agents to honor the supply contracts that are associated with a Walrasian equilibrium allocation. This is fairly straightforward for one-period spot markets in the absence of adverse sel...
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Traders that operate in markets with multiple competing marketplaces can use learning to choose in which marketplace they will trade, and how much they will shout in that marketplace. If traders are able to share information with each other about their shout price and market choice over a social network, they can trend towards the market equilibrium more quickly, leading to higher profits for i...
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Iterative auctions can reach an outcome before all bidders have revealed all their preference information. This can decrease costs associated with communication, deliberation, and loss of privacy. We propose an explicit cost model that is inspired by single-item Internet auctions, such as those taking place on auction sites (eBay) or via informal communication (craigslist, mailing lists). A non...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.005