International Share Ownership, Profit Shifting and Protectionism
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0932-4569
DOI: 10.1628/093245608784514527