International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Costly Monetary Transfers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Asymmetry, optimal transfers and international environmental agreements
Science in 2008 to advance public and private action on climate change through innovative, rigorous research. The Centre is funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council and has five inter-linked research programmes: 1. Developing climate science and economics 2. Climate change governance for a new global deal 3. Adaptation to climate change and human development 4. Governments, markets...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Environmental and Resource Economics
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0924-6460,1573-1502
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-014-9837-1