International Environmental Agreements and Black Technology
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract This paper analyzes the stability of international environmental agreements in a dynamic game when generation both renewables and fossil fuel based energy requires specialized capital stocks or technologies, respectively. Two contract types are considered. At an incomplete (a complete) contract, coalition coordinates only (both) CO $$_2$$ 2 emissions (and renewable investments) its members. In contrast to results Battaglini Harstad (J Polit Econ 124:160–204, 2016) who endorse contracts increase size, small coalitions stable regardless whether is complete incomplete. result also holds if black technology temporary not completely used transfers
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Environmental and Resource Economics
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1573-1502', '0924-6460']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-022-00668-z