Internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Against Phenomenal Conservatism
Recently, Michael Huemer has defended the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. This principle has potentially farreaching implications. Huemer uses it to argue against skepticism and to defend a version of ethical intuitionism. I employ a reductio to show that P...
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This paper compares and contrasts Michael Huemer’s Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism with Husserl’s well-known Principle of All Principles. Despite some similarities, I argue that the two are quite different. I examine several cases in which the theories provide different assessments of a belief’s epistemic status, and argue that Husserl’s gives the correct answer in each case. I also argue ...
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Epistemic naturalism holds that the results or methodologies from the cognitive sciences are relevant to epistemology, and some have maintained that scientific methods are more compatible with externalist theories of justification than with internalist theories. But practically all discussions about naturalized epistemology are framed exclusively in terms of cognitive psychology, which is only ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophical Issues
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1533-6077,1758-2237
DOI: 10.1111/phis.12180