Interlinked Contracts: An Empirical Study

Contracts: an Empirical Perspective

Modern legal scholars frequently and increasingly base their analyses on the assumption, grounded largely in the extensive experimental literature, that individuals are subject to a number of systematic behavioral biases. Within the legal literature, behavioral economic analysis has been relied upon to generate a significant number of proposals for paternalistic regulation. These proposals are ...

Dispute Resolution Clauses in International Contracts: An Empirical Study

Contracts in Offshore Software Development: An Empirical Analysis

Anandasivam Gopal • Konduru Sivaramakrishnan • M. S. Krishnan Tridas Mukhopadhyay Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742 Bauer College of Business, University of Houston, Houston, Texas 77204 University of Michigan Business School, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109 Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Mellon Uni...

On the Nonexclusivity of Loan Contracts: An Empirical Investigation

A string of theoretical papers shows that the non-exclusivity of credit contracts generates important negative contractual externalities. Employing a unique dataset, we identify how these externalities affect the supply of credit. Using internal information on a creditor’s willingness to lend, we find that a creditor reduces its credit supply when a borrower obtains a loan at another creditor (...

Key Factors of Joint-liability Loan Contracts an Empirical Analysis

This paper provides an empirical analysis of joint-liability micro-lending contracts. Using our data set from Constanta (a Georgian micro-lender), we examine the efficacy of various incentives set by this contract such as joint-liability between groups of borrowers or group access to future and to larger loans. As proposed by theory, we find that joint liability induces a group formation where ...