INTERDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF LEVERAGE, DIVIDEND, AND MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP POLICIES: Agencies Perspectives
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Large dividend increases and leverage
We study the leverage of firms making large dividend increases. Over the five years following the dividend increase they raise leverage enough to finance the entire dividend increase for that period with debt. This is not explained by trade-off variables or the pecking order. The effect is greatest for big firms with low-powered incentives, suggesting an agency effect whereby they make large di...
متن کاملStrategic Trade Policies and Managerial Incentives under International Cross Ownership
This paper examines the implications of the separation of ownership and management based on a strategic export promotion policy when the shares of exporting firms are internationally owned by the residents of both countries in an international duopolistic market. Although the presence of either cross ownership or managerial delegation weakens the exporting countries’ subsidization incentives, t...
متن کاملDividend policy, managerial ownership and debt financing: A non-parametric perspective
This paper examines the relation between dividend policy, managerial ownership and debt-financing for a large sample of firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. In addition to standard parametric estimation methods,weusea semi-parametric approach,whichhelps capturemoreeffectivelynon-linearities in thedata. In linewith the alignment effect ofmanagerial ownership, our results support a negative rel...
متن کاملManagerial Hedging and Equity Ownership
Managerial Hedging and Equity Ownership Risk-averse managers can hedge the aggregate component of their exposure to firm’s cash flow risk by trading in financial markets, but cannot hedge their firm-specific exposure. This gives them incentives to pass up firm-specific projects in favor of standard projects that contain greater aggregate risk. Such risk substitution gives rise to excessive aggr...
متن کاملFounding Family Ownership and Dividend Smoothing
This paper examines the relation between ownership structure and dividend smoothing by comparing the degree of dividend smoothing engaged in by family and non-family firms. We expect family firms to exhibit less dividend smoothing behaviour than non-family firms due to lower agency conflicts and less information asymmetry experienced by family firms. Based on a sample of S&P 500 firms from 1997...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business
سال: 2006
ISSN: 2338-7238,1411-1128
DOI: 10.22146/gamaijb.5619