Interception in differential pursuit/evasion games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Values in Differential Games
1. Introduction. Two person zero-sum differential games can be considered as control problems with two opposing controllers or players. One player seeks to maximize and one to minimize the pay-off function. The greatest pay-off that the maximizing player can force is termed the lower value of the game and similarly the least value which the minimizing player can force is called the upper value....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Dynamics and Games
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2164-6066
DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2016018