Intentionalism, defeasibility, and justification
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Against Intentionalism
Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenological properties of a perceptual experience supervene on its intentional properties. The paper presents a counterexample to this claim, one that concerns visual grouping phenomenology. I argue that this example is superior to superficially similar examples involving grouping phenomenology offered by Peacocke (1983), because the standard intentiona...
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The pain case can appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory, I argue. After categorising versions of pain intentionalism along two dimensions, I argue that an “objectivist” and “non-mentalist” version is the most promising, provided it can withstand tw...
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This seminar will be organized around a loosely related collection of readings on defaults, defeasibility, and argumentation that I think are, or should be, of real importance for certain areas of philosophy, but whose bearing on the subject has not been explored in detail. Just to establish the philosophical relevance of this kind of work, we will begin by (A) reading quickly through my recent...
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Are the properties of communicative acts grounded in the intentions with which they are performed, or in the conventions that govern them? The latest round in this debate has been sparked by Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone (2015), who argue that much more of communication is conventional than we thought, and that the rest isn’t really communication after all, but merely the initiation of open-en...
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According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intentionalism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology. Second, it seems that even if we can come up...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophical Studies
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0031-8116,1573-0883
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-015-0538-6