Institutions and Policy in Iran’s Relations with the GCC

Two overlapping yet distinct sets of developments influence Iran’s position in the Persian Gulf region, one having to do with Islamic Republic’s own policies and other structural factors that are largely beyond control policymakers Tehran. In terms policy, Tehran’s regional relations shaped by a confluence security as well diplomatic priorities. At broadest level, resulting policy output amounts ensuring interests waterway while at same time maintaining friendly or best non-confrontational states Cooperation Council (GCC). Under Rouhani administration, this was summed up under rubric Hormuz Peace Endeavor, HOPE. But such pursuits have been consistently hampered both indigenous Iranian politics exogenous. Within Iran, insistence Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which is responsible for country’s security, repeatedly demonstrate its military prowess battle readiness—through holding exercises, drone attacks, rhetorical if not actual support Yemeni Houthis—heightens dilemma only serves further antagonize United States local allies. time, newly found confidence ambitions countries Saudi Arabia especially Arab Emirates, backed what appeared unconditional American Trump administration continued arms sales close ties during Biden presidency, perpetuate threat perceptions From perspective, serve undermine objectives. Using presidency case study, article examines role interplay between structure agency, form initiatives, shaping posture behavior region. foreign product deliberations give-and-take compromises three influential but unequal centers power. These extension ministry, whose primary field expertise policy; IRGC, charge national inside outside country; Leader, currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has final say on whatever two groups propose recommend. The initiatives thus generated find themselves environment highly securitized sectarianized, midst appears be an intractable dilemma, heavily influenced, altogether by, States, acts external balancer provider makes original contributions. First, it demonstrates appearances contrary, self-contradictory. Policies produced through deliberations, negotiations, among centers, each strong corporate identities own. Although all power involved making there institutional coordination less powerful namely executive IRGC. recommendation then sent Leader his approval. A second insight revolves around interaction Tehran toward geared. point. President tried pursue rapprochement détente neighbors. efforts fell short because pervasive features Gulf—sectarianism securitization, US influence, dilemma—were deeply entrenched easily subject change. Through HOPE initiative change environment. president launched campaign, prevailing had long become institutionalized already. What suggesting simple adjustments tweaking; he sought fundamental reordering arrangement, Iran neighbors, including whom tense relations, work collectively collaboratively ensure security. This flew face region’s deep challenged went against very logic sectarianism. Rouhani’s were undermined arrangements come assume over course last several decades. Institutions can defined “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, created, communicated, enforced officially sanctioned channels.” They “rules procedures channels widely accepted official.”11 Gretchen Helmke Steven Levitsky, “Introduction,” Informal Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, eds (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), p. 5. Across GCC, outlined here assumed rules norms guide assumptions predict behavior. have, words, institutionalized. Institutions, course, immune change, they may even extensively.22 Kathleen Thalen, “How Evolve: Insights Comparative Historical Analysis,” Analysis Social Sciences, James Mahoney Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge 2003), pp. 208-240; and, Margaret Levi, “Theories Institutional Change.” PS, Vol. 20, no. 3 (1987), 684-88. occur, kind Rouhani, announcing seeking promote speeches public diplomacy hardly enough. needed sustained, multipronged effort. It also required buy-in actors stakes arrangements, whereby could joining more beneficial their than otherwise case. That never took place. HOPE, fact, little chance success start. initiative, far possibility Gulf’s end. proposal’s fate did demonstrate, nevertheless, foreseeable future, Gulf, broadly, unlikely constructing arguments, begins examination policymaking presidency. looks how these interacted themselves, sometimes reinforcing them, sectarianism example, times bumping happened initiative. changeable, immovable either. Sifting opacity seemingly contradictory voices coming out sum total seemed designed facilitate neighbors south. efforts’ lack render them completely irrelevant, however. Change still happen, new office comes elite preferences hand within political system other. make-up system, multiple decision-making responsibilities often competing agendas. Several combined make impact particularly felt process formulation. During alongside tension reduction, included, most importantly, increasing involvement decisions known, along similar increase weight compound effect seem disjoined incoherent outside. More given formulation bargains negotiations power—the IRGC—Iranian tends reactive unable capitalize opportunities emerge.33 earlier periods, when rife factionalism, nature factional competition. See, Mehran Kamrava, “National Security Debates Iran: Factionalism Lost Opportunities,” Middle East Policy, 14, No. 2, (Summer 2007), 84-100. underwent dramatic shift after 2013 presidential elections, departure Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, since 2005, inauguration Hassan Rouhani. throwback days revolution, Ahmadinejad inner circle saw international inherently flawed unjust. To organizations Nations lost much credibility act impartially uphold just order; Israeli regime commits crimes humanity flaunting nuclear non-proliferation treaty bullies those consider threats interests; superpowers invade impunity impose will weaker states, meanwhile stockpiling weapons preventing others access meaningful forms defense.44 Hamid Mowlana Manochehr Mohammadi, Siyasat-e Khareji-e Jomhuri Eslami dar Dowlat-e (The Foreign Policy Republic Ahmadinejad’s Administration), (Tehran: Dadgostar, 1387/2008), 135-138. vocal about views system. Reinforced populist persona carefully cultivated home abroad, ideological driven internationally disruptive ideals animated revolution thirty years earlier. particular, statements Israel destined disappear world map, refusal yield demands International Atomic Energy Agency lower enrichment level centrifuges, gave outward appearance being dogmatic. reality, however, substance rather pragmatic rhetoric incendiary. Over eight office, wrote number letters Presidents Bush Obama, seeking, way, open dialogue counterparts. He traveled Riyadh official business. Even issue, eagerly signed joint Brazilian-Turkish 2010, rebuffed refused endorse agreement.55 Mehmet Ozkan, “Turkey-Brazil Involvement Nuclear Issue: Is Big Deal?” Strategic Analysis, 35, 1, (January 2011), 26-30. Elected platform moderation presented stark contrast fiery rhetoric. Assisted able diplomat person Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, set repair resolve issue entering into direct States. While ultimately resolved July 2015 signing Joint Comprehensive Plan Action, fallout 2011 uprisings sectarianized region ever before. Weak collapsing proliferated – Libya, Syria Yemen going way Iraq Lebanon gone providing space opportunity proxy wars sponsorship outright deployment nonstate actors. long-standing strategic competition geographic territorial dimensions, now added Lebanese theater rivalry. invasion Emirates March 2015, Yemen’s Houthi rebels, tensions side Arabia, UAE Israel, other.66 For see, “Multipolarity Instability East,” Orbis, 62, 4, (Fall 2018), 598-616. peace, stability, progress welfare residents Strait enhance mutual understanding peaceful amongst them. includes various venues cooperation, collective supply energy freedom navigation free transfer oil resources beyond.77 text speech, elaboration www.president.ir/en/111465. initiative’s announcement followed Arabia’s King Salman Bahrain’s Hamad following month effort reduce countries. According government, “the basis peace stability… We believe bilaterals pressures should take away other.”88 Cited in, Tom O’Connor, “Iran Writes Letter Warns Its Time Has Passed,” Newsweek, (November 2019), www.newsweek.com/iran-letter-saudi-us-time-past-1469666. broad elites, praised inclusive endogenous i.e. reaching common roots tackle orientation, commitment tension-reduction trying foster another alliance would purchases securitization.99 Keyhan Barzegar, “Evaluating Endeavor,” Lobe Log, November 6, 2019, lobelog.com/evaluating-the-hormuz-peace-endeavor/. endorsement second, perhaps important, center establishment, Leader. Since 1989, Khamenei chosen Velayat-e Faqih undergone steady changes. 1990s, politically savvy Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani president, seldom matters “consulted” few topics, mostly related file trend 2000s, began contested elections 2009, became steadily directly domestic relations.1010 “The 2009 Presidential Elections Changing Political Landscape,” 54, (July 2010), 401. deterioration Majles, deepened latter’s state politics, known openly Khamenei’s transformation “guardian” (vali) active player coincide polarization deepening roles later Yemen. Ideologically, always fallen somewhere right spectrum, emerged stalwart “hardline” factions. Crucially, growing formulation, before deal European Union, possible without Leader’s blessing. hardline belies approach relations. positions endorsements reveals thinking informed defensive realist perspective rests balance power, threat, interconnected offense-defense balance.1111 Barzegar Masood Rezaei, “Rahbord-e Defai-ye az Manzar-e Khamenei,” (Iran’s Defense Strategy Perspective Khamanei), Faslnameh Motale‘at-e Rahbordi, 19, (Winter 2016), 14-27. third, important establishment Observers unanimously agree couple decades IRGC “has grown segment ruling establishment,” senior commanders “function independently rest government.”1212 Sara Bazoobandi, “Iran’s Guards: Four Decades Expanded Business Military Influence,” Institute Washington, Issue Paper, 8, (2019), 1. current generation leaders recruits, generally considered belong organization’s third generation, tend conservative hardliner. first recruits commanders, joined force outset came religious wealthy families loyal revolution. Having fought Iran-Iraq war 1980 retired moved activities. opportunistic. Not surprisingly, 1997 some 73 percent IRGC’s rank reported voted reformist Khatami. 2000, apparent reaction force’s supposed laxity, ordered undertake enhanced indoctrination members. year force, drawn mainly Basiji therefore outlook. loyalty amply display quelled protests, amenable personally Khamenei.1313 Saeid Golkar, Views States,” 21, 2014), 59. members fore greater near-abroad. many ways representative Gen. Hossein Salami, appointed commander-in-chief April 2019. Salami’s outlook does appear different previous commanders. But, keeping tenor times, language blunt, issuing warnings cautioning “not cross red lines” Iran.1414 Fatima Alsmadi, Guard: Strong Family Generations,” Al Jazeera Center Studies, (August 7, 2019),” 13. doctrine conceives hegemonic aspirations requires continually exploit opponents needed, wage war. When according doctrine, resorts variety affect ranging “hard” “semi-hard,” “soft,” intelligence wars.1515 Guards,” 53-54. As defender considers defense motherland allies sacred duty. result major reorganization former commander, Jafari (2007-2019), 2000s significant changes professionalized. credited refining leadership’s asymmetric warfare, innovative strategies, addressing soft threats.1616 Joshua Himes, Navies: Maturing Maritime Strategy,” Report, Study War, (October 6. division labor occurred regular navy (IRIN) naval (IRGCN), IRIN Caspian Sea north waters east Bandar Abbas south, IRGCN constituting “a coastal focused mobile combat capabilities Gulf.”1717 Ibid., 7. killing General Qassem Suleimani, charismatic commander Quds Force January 2020, fundamentally altered modus operandi. One reason organizational underway larger predate Suleimani’s killing, likely continue future. include militia divided nationalities Syria, Hezbollah, Afghan Fatemiyoun Division, Pakistani Zeinabiyoun Brigade, Iraqi militias. Similarly, itself transforming expeditionary indicated disproportionately high casualties organization suffered compared personnel losses Force.1818 Alfouneh, After Suleimani,” (May 29, 2020), https://agsiw.org/the-quds-force-after-suleimani/. finds empowered made weighty considerations.1919 Amr Yossef, “Upgrading Doctrine: An Offensive ‘Forward Defense,’” Institute, December 10, www.mei.edu/publications/upgrading-irans-military-doctrine-offensive-forward-defense. Nevertheless, orthodoxy nationalist zeal, displayed considerable pragmatism, notable example 2015. Again, careful retaliation Suleimani inflict heavy damage facilities personnel. Conventionally spoiler efforts, swayed president’s economic considerations hand, fears cyber-attacks factifies other.2020 Farhad Rezaei Somayeh Khodaei Moshirabad, accepter agreement,” British Journal Eastern 45, (2018), 147-151. critical pragmatic, actor dogmatic one. sharp threatening, invariably behind positions, intimately concerned. context regards expressed. overall execution, weighed word. addition responsibilities, main management militias non-state Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon; maritime protection west Strait; production missile like talks tough, shown himself actually realist, frequently partnering play bad cop Zarif good cops. Each use slightly inflections basically thing, though variations emphasis across expressions discordant policies. There centers. managing internally borders All Supreme National Council, chaired president. involving carries Council’s decisions.2121 Standing President, Speaker Majlis, Chief Justice, representative, Staff, Commanders Army Ministers Affairs, Interior, Intelligence. recent years, included suppression protests cities, carrying attacks targets country.2222 On occasions, 2018 onward, demonstrated willingness missiles combat, lethal accurate hitting precision. precise difficult impossible verify. Some examples, headquarters Kurdish opposition group Kurdistan September 2018, attack Daesh base October shooting down June Aramco facility Abqaiq bases 2020 Suleimani. activities, expansive empire corporations, banks, factories, media outlets, real estate increased presence visibility everyday lives Iranians. securitization environments presence. inform large particular. calculations relation extra-regional present proximity Iran. stated wants “neither nor peace” States.2323 Lara Jakes, Edward Wong, Julian E. Barnes, “US Maintains Pressure Stalling Diplomacy Expecting Attacks,” New York Times, February 27, 2020. vein, none want see or, matter, any capitals.2424 Banafsheh Keynoush, “Saudi Are Adapting Perpetual Conflict,” Atlantic May 23, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/saudi-arabia-and-iran-are-adapting-to-perpetual-conflict/. diplomats independent determine preferences. kingdom decides policies, assume, meet implicit explicit approval States.2525 Hamzeh Safavi Mahdieh Madannezhad, Goftar-haee Ravabet-e va Arabestan (Discussions Iran-Saudi Relations), Moasseseh Ayandeh Pazhouhi Jahan-e Eslam, 1398/2019), 44. Therefore, dealing Saudis necessitates indirectly engaging Americans. despite hardline, US, realism. factor guiding legacy Iraq. Many