Institutions and Efficiency in Transition Economies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Institutions and Efficiency in Transition Economies
This paper analyzes the effects of political and economic institutions on efficiency of transition economies over the 1995-2005 period. Perpetual Inventory Method is used to construct capital series for these countries, and then stochastic production frontier analysis is used to estimate the efficiency scores and effects of institutions at the same time. The empirical results show that better i...
متن کاملInstitutions and Firms in Transition Economies
Prepared for the Handbook Of New Institutional Economics. Focusing on firm behavior, the paper examines the collapse of socialist institutions, the building of capitalist institutions, changing firm boundaries, transactional governance, corporate governance, and use of the legal system. The contrast between law's use in transactions and its relative ineffectiveness in corporate governance sugge...
متن کاملTraining and Productive Efficiency in Transition Economies
Much work has been done on the efficiency and management development of enterprises in China since the implementation of economic reforms. It has been argued that the problem of skills incompentence of the workforce is one of the fundamental factors hindering the overall performance of enterprises in China, particularly the state-owned enterprises. At the same time, low efficiency performance w...
متن کاملInstitutions and moral hazard in open economies
I investigate the interaction between international trade and national institutional development in an environment characterized by heterogeneous individuals choosing their education levels to maximize their utilities; and institutions alleviating moral hazard by allowing managers to better observe and verify the productive efforts of workers. Liberalized trade allows institutions to serve as i...
متن کاملOn Corruption and Institutions in Decentralized Economies
This paper studies opportunistic behaviour in a model of decentralized economic exchange and inadequate institutional framework of formal contract enforcement. It is shown that (i) when the number of cheating traders is sufficiently large, inadequate institutions (e.g. due to insufficient legal provisions and/or ineffective enforcement of existing laws) result in a loss of decentralized trading...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2025327