Institutions and economic development: theory, policy and history
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Reply to the comments on ‘ Institutions and Economic Development : Theory , Policy and History
This article is a reply to the comments made on my target article, ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’, at the beginning of this issue.
متن کاملInstitutions and Policy Learning Supporting Economic Development
The paper argues that a narrow conceptualization of institutions as more or less similar to ‘good governance’ is not conductive for an understanding of the institutional underpinnings of the learning economy. In stead an explicit focus on a broad set of institutions that support learning is needed. Improving learning and innovation capabilities is not only a question of more resources for educa...
متن کاملInstitutions, Markets and Economic Co-ordination: Linking Development Policy to Theory and Praxis
This article explores policy applications of ‘new institutional economics’ theory in relation to markets and economic development. It argues for application of an analytical framework which instead of looking at institutions primarily in terms of their contributions to making competitive markets work better, sees such markets as one form of institution fulfilling exchange and co-ordination func...
متن کاملInstitutions and Economic Development : The Role of Collective Action Theory
How frequently in recommending changes one confronts the retort that such suggestions of change are of no use since "the powers that be" cannot he budged, i.e., the existing system is too entrenched to permit change. Such pessimism about the prospects for change is especially common in developing countries. The purpose of the present paper is to explore the possibilities of drawing on the theor...
متن کاملContracting Institutions and Economic Development
This paper studies the effects of contracting institutions on economic development. A model is presented with endogenous incomplete markets, where financial frictions generated by the imperfect enforcement of contracts depend on the future growth of the economy, which determines the costs of being excluded from financial markets after defaulting. As the economy approaches its steady state, fric...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Institutional Economics
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1744-1374,1744-1382
DOI: 10.1017/s1744137410000378