Institutional trading, information production, and forced CEO turnovers

نویسندگان

چکیده

We analyze transaction-level data on institutional trading and examine information flows around CEO turnovers. find that prior to a turnover is positively related the nature of (forced versus voluntary). further institutions produce partly by analyzing insider turnover, though they are able additional independently as well. Finally, we after forced with an successor subsequent long-run stock returns, realizes significant abnormal profits. Overall, our results consistent notion production institutions, their making use this information, improves environment • turnovers Institutional predicts turnover: voluntary Institutions Post-forced returns also realize profits from such

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Corporate Finance

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['0929-1199', '1872-6313']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101884