Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance

Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance

The growing dominance of equity holdings by institutional investors, both domestic and international, is casting a sharp focus on their activities and owners and monitors of firms. It is suggested that whereas some general considerations arise in all cases, it is useful to separate discussion of the developments in the Anglo Saxon countries and continental Europe/Japan. The former is showing an...

Game Analysis of Institutional Investors Participating in Corporate Governance

By building a game model between the institutional investors and the management, an analysis has been conducted to uncover the influential factors that are crucial to the role switching of institutional investors when confronting tunneling behaviors of the management: supervision cost, shareholding ratio, invisible income, fines and patience. In cases of lower supervision cost, higher sharehold...

Institutional Investors and Corporate Investment

This paper investigates whether institutional investors influence firms’ investment in real assets and reduce the managerial agency conflict in investment choices. Institutional investors’ holdings of U.S. firms have gone from 10% of shares outstanding in 1960, to well over 60% in 2005. Importantly, given their significant ownership stakes and investment horizons, we expect them to closely moni...

Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance and the Performance of the Corporate Sector

Proportions of equity held by institutional investors are rising across all OECD countries. Paradigms of corporate governance involving a key role for institutions are market control via equity (the takeover sanction), market control via debt (LBOs) and direct control via equity (corporate governance activism). Even in countries where institutions are currently unimportant to corporate governan...

The Role of institutional Investors in the Corporate Governance By : Moshe Pinto . 2004 - 2005 ERASMUS