Inspection games in arms control

Inspection Games in Arms Control

An inspection game is a mathematical model of a situation in which an inspector verifies the adherence of an inspectee to some legal obligation, such as an arms control treaty, where the inspectee may have an interest in violating that obligation. The mathematical analysis seeks to determine an optimal inspection scheme, ideally one which will induce legal behavior, under the assumption that th...

Inspection of Economic Records as an Arms Control Technique

The following discussion presumes some broad arms limitation program, rather than simply a nuclear test ban, and focuses on the inspection of economic records as part of an effort to verify adherence to (detect evasion of) an agreement limiting weapons production. The special problems involved in inspecting different kinds of weapons production-for example, aircraft, missiles, and fissionable m...

Inspection games in arms control by RUDOLPH AVENHAUS, MORTON CANTY, D. MARC KILGOUR, BERNHARD VON STENGEL and SHMUEL ZAMIR

An inspection game is a mathematical model of a situation in which an inspector verifies the adherence of an inspectee to some legal obligation, such as an arms control treaty, where the inspectee may have an interest in violating that obligation. The mathematical analysis seeks to determine an optimal inspection scheme, ideally one which will induce legal behavior, under the assumption that th...

Inspection Games

Inspection Games

We examine the effectiveness of bonuses and fines in an ‘inspection game’ where an employer can learn the effort of a worker through costly inspection. Standard game theoretic analysis predicts that fines discourage shirking, whereas bonuses encourage shirking. In contrast, ownpayoff effects suggest that both fines and bonuses discourage shirking. In an experiment we find that fines are more ef...