Inside the Black Box: Incentive Regulation and Incentive Channeling on Energy Markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incentive Based Regulation in Energy Markets
Quality of service has emerged as an important issue in the regulation of electricity distribution networks. Incentive regulation is supposed to promote cost saving, investment efficiency as well as service quality. Service quality regulation may involve a political aspect that may come into conflict with economic considerations. Although individually tailored service qualities would result in ...
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This paper reviews in turn the papers in this Symposium on incentive regulation. It adduces the UK experience with incentive regulation, particularly in the electricity sector, to evaluate, amongst other things, the reasons for development and adoption of this approach, the determinants of setting X, and the case for more advanced metering. It suggests, among other things, that price caps can b...
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In a Fisher market, a market maker sells m items to n potential buyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and money endowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information, derives market equilibrium prices and allocations of its items. While agents may benefit by misreporting their private information, we show that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strateg...
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Survey methodologists borrowed the think aloud method from cognitive psychology in order to make respondents’ thinking explicit in a variety of tasks. The method has become a central feature of cognitive interviewing to pretest questionnaires. In adapting the method for pretesting, survey researchers changed it in important ways that may have implications for data quality, either for better or ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2179021