Insecurity of position-based quantum-cryptography protocols against entanglement attacks
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Insecurity of position-based quantum cryptography protocols against entanglement attacks
Recently, position-based quantum cryptography has been claimed to be unconditionally secure. On the contrary, here we show that the existing proposals for position-based quantum cryptography are, in fact, insecure if entanglement is shared among two adversaries. Specifically, we demonstrate how the adversaries can incorporate ideas of quantum teleportation and quantum secret sharing to compromi...
متن کاملSecurity of Quantum Cryptography against Collective Attacks
We present strong attacks against quantum key distribution schemes which use quantum memories and quantum gates to attack directly the final key. We analyze a specific attack of this type, for which we find the density matrices available to the eavesdropper and the optimal information which can be extracted from them. We prove security against this attack and discuss security against any attack...
متن کاملPosition-Based Quantum Cryptography
In this work, we initiate the study of position-based cryptography in the quantum setting. The aim is to use the geographical position of a party as its only credential. This has interesting applications, e.g., it enables two military bases to communicate over insecure channels and without having any pre-shared key, with the guarantee that only parties within the bases learn the content of the ...
متن کاملEntanglement and Quantum Cryptography
Quantum cryptography is one of the most important quantum information applications. The present thesis covers several topics on quantum cryptography, such as the security analysis of quantum channels for key distribution protocols and the study of quantum cloning. First, we introduce a general formalism to characterize the cryptographic properties of quantum channels in the realistic scenario w...
متن کاملQuantum cryptography protocols robust against photon number splitting attacks for weak laser pulse implementations.
We introduce a new class of quantum key distribution protocols, tailored to be robust against photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. We study one of these protocols, which differs from the original protocol by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) only in the classical sifting procedure. This protocol is provably better than BB84 against PNS attacks at zero error.
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Physical Review A
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1050-2947,1094-1622
DOI: 10.1103/physreva.83.012322